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1 Introduction
Suppose it is admitted that when all individuals prefer a state of affairs to an-
other, the social preference should follow their unanimous assessment. Then
it seems hard to avoid the conclusion that when all individuals are indifferent
between the two states of affairs, so should the social judgment be one of indif-
ference. Because if the social judgment was a strict preference in that case, it
would remain so in the case when all individuals have a strict but slight prefer-
ence in the other direction, unless the social preferences are discontinuous with
respect to the state of affairs.
This is a simple idea, and it is part of the folk knowledge in welfare economics.
Nevertheless, it has recently been formally stated in two papers, independently
and simultaneously. But the two publications are very different in style and
content.
In one case (Suzumura 2001), this simple fact is only a small part of a much
more elaborate construction in which it is shown, under precise conditions,
how all of the so-called Pareto principles1 are equivalent. It is presented as a
technical and precise formulation of an idea which has no profound philosophical
or political implications, and it is published in a journal which is dedicated to
the diffusion of this kind of results.
This is in stark contrast with the other publication of the same argument
(Kaplow and Shavell 2001). Here, no further elaboration of this idea is at-
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1Namely, according to the terminology of the quoted paper: Weak Pareto (x is socially
preferred to y if all individuals strictly prefer x), Pareto-Indifference (x is socially indifferent
to y if all individuals are indifferent between x and y), Strong Pareto (x is socially preferred to
y if all individuals weakly prefer x and at least one individual strictly prefers x), Full Pareto
(the combination of Pareto-Indifference and Strong Pareto).
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tempted, and the formal presentation is reduced to its minimum. But, although
the formal result is very limited in content, the authors somehow manage to
derive impressive political conclusions from it, arguing, in a nutshell, that it
vindicates welfarism and excludes any consideration of fairness principles and
any deviation from purely welfarist social welfare functions in political decision-
making and institution design. And this appears in a generalist journal with a
wide impact.
The problem, however, is that the conclusions of Kaplow and Shavell are
gross overstatements, based on misrepresentations of such important notions as
welfarism and fairness.
2 The result
The target of Kaplow and Shavell is what they consider a common belief among
policy-makers, citizens and even some economists, namely “that it would be
reasonable to include some extra-utility elements, of fairness or of justice, in
the social welfare function (in addition to concerns about distribution, which
welfarism admits).” (2001, p. 282) And they pretend to show “that, for any
non-welfarist method of policy assessment (i.e. for any nonindividualistic social
welfare function), there always exist circumstances in which the Pareto principle
is violated.” (ibid.) What they mean by the Pareto principle is the Weak Pareto
condition, and what they mean by a nonindividualistic social welfare function is
any social welfare function violating the Pareto-indifference condition.2 Their
formal result is, as described informally in the introduction above, that the Weak
Pareto condition implies Pareto indifference (under some ancillary assumptions,
notably a continuity condition).
On the basis of this result, their conclusions are, first, that social decisions
should only rely on a traditional social welfare function of the following sort:
W (U1(x), ..., Un(x)),
where Ui(x), for i = 1, ..., n, is individual i’s utility in state x, and, second, that
non-welfarist fairness principles should be discarded.
Their formal result is correct, but their conclusions cannot be derived from
it unless one severely misinterprets the concepts of welfarism and of fairness.
3 What is welfarism?
Kaplow and Shavell seem to believe that the Pareto indifference condition cap-
tures the idea of welfarism. But that is not the case. Welfarism, as defined
in welfare economics and social choice theory, is much more demanding, and
requires that the social preference relation in the utility space is the same for
all possible profiles of individual utility functions. For instance, the utilitarian
brand of welfarism takes the sum of utility in all circumstances. And it is well
2See the previous footnote for definitions.
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established that no version of the Pareto condition can entail welfarism by it-
self.3 Hence, nothing in the paper of Kaplow and Shavell provides an argument
in favour of welfarism understood in this standard way.
The Pareto-indifference condition means only that, for a given profile of
utility functions (U1, ..., Un), there exists a ranking of the space of utilities which
represents transitive social preferences. But the Pareto-indifference condition
does not at all force us to apply this ranking when considering a different profile
of utility functions (V1, ..., Vn). For example, suppose that Ui(x) = Vi(x) and
Ui(y) = Vi(y) for all i. A welfarist approach requires the ranking between x and
y to be independent of the utility profile in question. But, of course, this does
not follow from the Pareto-indifference condition, because this condition has
nothing to say about the relationship between rankings based on different utility
profiles. It is only a condition on how to rank alternatives for a given profile
of utility functions, and similarly, for all the other Pareto conditions. Hence,
these conditions do not at all exclude the possibility of taking into account
non-welfarist information when moving from one utility profile to another.
What kind of non-welfarist information may one like to take into account
when moving from one utility profile to another? A prominent answer is provided
by a branch of welfare economics usually called the “theory of fair allocation”
or the “theory of fairness”. To this notion we now turn.
4 What is fairness?
As far as fairness is concerned, Kaplow and Shavell are shaping the discussion
in a very peculiar way. They do not focus on the need for a theory of fairness
in order to solve conflicts between people. Rather, they look at principles of
fairness and justice that are valued in their own right, that is regardless of their
consequences for individual welfare. And it is suggested that examples of such
principles are that individuals’ rewards should be based on merit, that pun-
ishment should fit the crime, and that horizontal equity and basic capabilities
should be taken into account when making social evaluations. Their argument
is that if a social evaluator accords weight to such ideas, then at least he or she
would prefer a state of the world x to another y, if these principles are more
respected in x than y and everyone is indifferent between x and y.
But this way of posing the problem misses the main point with theories
of fairness, namely that in general they are valued because they are consid-
ered appropriate ways of solving conflicts of interest between people. The aim
of most non-welfarist approaches is to challenge the distribution of utility as
the framework for solving conflicts. Hence, these principles are usually not sug-
gested as elements of fairness that should be taken into account in addition to
what Kaplow and Shavell name distributive considerations, that is, consider-
ations based on utility, but rather that they should be used instead of such
considerations.
3See d’Aspremont and Gevers (1977) and, for a survey, Sen (1986).
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An interesting question, then, is whether one can use non-welfarist concepts
of fairness in order to solve cases of conflict and at the same time satisfy the
Pareto principles. As we have alluded to above, the “theory of fair allocation”
provides a positive answer to this question.4 More specifically, this theory says
that one should pay attention to the change in the overall preference struc-
ture of individuals when considering the possibility of revising the ranking of
alternatives when there is a change in the utility profile. Essentially all allo-
cation rules studied within this branch of welfare economics are required to
select only Pareto-efficient allocations, and most of these allocation rules do not
make any distinction between Pareto-indifferent allocations. But they are not
based on the maximization of classical social welfare functions, and, actually,
most of them just ignore utilities and rely only on individual preferences. As
an example, consider social preferences favoring, as the optimal social state,
the egalitarian Walrasian equilibrium where all agents have the same budget.
Such preferences satisfy the Pareto-indifference condition in the sense that if an
allocation is feasible and is Pareto-indifferent to an egalitarian Walrasian equi-
librium, it is also an egalitarian equilibrium and is therefore selected as well.
And it has recently been shown that this allocation rule also maximizes non-
welfarist social preferences satisfying all the Pareto principles.5 But, as is well
known, the egalitarian equilibrium cannot be rationalized as the optimal state
for a classical social welfare function,6 because the welfarist approach does not
allow us to include information on the overall preference structure of individuals
when ranking alternatives.
This is not to say that the different Pareto principles do not constrain the
possibility to use non-welfarist reasoning when solving cases of conflict. They
do, as shown by Sen (1970) and elaborated on by, among others, Gibbard (1979),
Moulin and Thomson (1997), Brun and Tungodden (1999). But these consider-
ations cannot be captured in any interesting way by the framework of Kaplow
and Shavell. Hence, it is a major overstatement when they claim that “[o]ur
conclusion, by contrast [to the impossibility result of Sen(1970)], is general in
that it applies to any form of non-welfarism” (Kaplow and Shavell 2001, p.
282). Their result only applies to a small subset of non-welfarist theories, and
for these theories it deals with a trivial tension between the Pareto principles
and a requirement of continuity.
5 What is the Pareto principle?
There is a third misleading message in Kaplow and Shavell (2001). They expose
Sen’s (1985) theory as an example of a theory which, by introducing function-
ings and capabilities, is going away from welfarism and the Pareto principles.7
4For a recent survey, see Moulin and Thomson (1997).
5See Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1996). In these non-welfarist social preferences, the convex
hull of the union of the individual upper contour sets plays a central role. The computation of
these social preferences does not make use of utilities, and relies only on individual preferences.
6Except in very special cases. See Eisenberg (1961).
7Rawls’ theory (1971), which focuses on primary goods, is a similar example.
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By giving this example they apparently mean that their argument somehow
questions the soundness of such a theory. That Sen’s theory is non-welfarist
is correct. That it should be shaken by Kaplow’s and Shavell’s argument is
another story. Although this is not very explicit, they apparently believe that
the Pareto principle should without question be conceived in terms of the sat-
isfaction of individuals’ ordinary preferences. But most philosophers and many
economists have questioned the soundness of individual ordinary preferences as
a basis of social evaluation. Ordinary preferences are usually misinformed, un-
reflected, myopic and sometimes antisocial. Many arguments of that sort lead
to the conclusion that it is not obvious how to conceive the most appropriate
notion of individual well-being.
Sen’s theory, and its likes,8 is constructed precisely on the basis of a thorough
evaluation of what should be the proper focus of social decisions, as far as the
definition of individual welfare is concerned. If the conclusion of this evaluation
is that individual welfare should be measured in terms of capabilities, then there
is not much reason to worry about violations of the Pareto principle with respect
to ordinary individual preferences. In the computation of capabilities, proper
weight is supposedly given to the satisfaction of individual preferences, among
other kinds of functionings.
A theory which redefines individual welfare in some other way than in terms
of utilities can, and probably should, redefine the Pareto principle similarly.
Social preferences, according to such a theory, should indeed favor an increase
in individual welfare as it is defined within this theory. And the advocates of
such non-welfarist theories have been careful, of course, to adopt this revised
Pareto principle.9
In other words, the point of these non-welfarist theories is usually less to
go against the Pareto principle than to look for the appropriate definition of
individual welfare to which the Pareto principle itself should be applied. It is
then quite awkward and naive to criticize non-welfarist theories on the basis of
the ordinary Pareto principle.
6 Conclusion
Suppose that someone told you that we should assign importance to the preser-
vation of the Grand Canyon beyond its impact on people’s welfare, and that
there should be cases where we accept a trade-off between the intrinsic value of
Grand Canyon and the welfare of people. Would it come as a surprise that we
would then have to go against the welfare of people on some occasions?
This is basically the story told by Kaplow and Shavell, and which they use to
vindicate welfarism and castigate fairness. Although their formal result is true
(trivially so), there are three main mistakes in their bold conclusions. First, it is
not true that the Pareto principles (even applied to ordinary preferences) forbid
any departure from classical social welfare functions. Second, it is not true that
8Such as Broome (1991).
9Broome (1991, p. 155) explicitly names this revised version the principle of personal good.
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concepts of fairness are generally incompatible with Pareto principles (and that
they deal mostly with non-conflictual situations). Third, it is not true that the
Pareto principle should unquestionably be conceived in terms of the satisfaction
of ordinary preferences. These three mistakes rely on a misrepresentation of the
notions of welfarism, fairness, and of the basic idea of the Pareto principles.
The developments of welfare economics and social choice theory in the last
decades, notably in the theory of fairness and non-welfarist theories of justice,
have not solved all problems and can rightly be criticized on many grounds.
But they deserve to be studied in depth, and cannot be dismissed as easily as
suggested by Kaplow and Shavell.
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